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OPINION 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare 
(“DPW”) appeals a decision of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania that sustained 
a directive of the United States Department of Health and 
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Human Services (“HHS”) that DPW must remit to the federal 
government more than $5.6 million in overpayments 
recovered by DPW under the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (“AFDC”) program.  DPW also appeals the District 
Court’s dismissal of a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
claim for lack of standing.  Discerning no error in the District 
Court’s rulings, we will affirm its judgment. 
I. 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
 The Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(“AFDC”) program was established by Title IV-A of the 
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617, to assist 
states in providing aid to needy children and their families.  
The AFDC program provided for federal reimbursement of a 
percentage of all qualifying state expenditures, which were 
calculated and reported on a quarterly basis.  42 U.S.C. § 
603(a)(1994).  The AFDC was considered an “open-ended 
entitlement program” because there was no cap on the amount 
of federal funds a state could receive in a fiscal year, and 
states were reimbursed for all qualifying expenditures. 
 The AFDC program also established a procedure for 
recovering and accounting for payments that states made to 
recipients who were ineligible to receive them.  The program 
required states to recover these overpayments, either by 
collecting direct cash repayments from the recipients, or 
through offsets to a future cash assistance payment.  45 
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13).  Because the AFDC recipients were 
needy, states generally recovered overpayments in 
installments over a period of time.  Once the overpayments 
were recovered, states were required to report the amounts 
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collected in their quarterly financial reports to HHS, which 
was responsible for administering the program.  45 C.F.R. § 
201.5(a)(3).  Federal payments for future quarters were then 
reduced pro rata by the federal share of the amount recovered 
by the state in the prior quarter.  42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(2)(1994). 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.), which replaced the AFDC program 
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) 
grant program. TANF was designed to give states greater 
flexibility in administering their welfare programs while 
reducing total federal welfare spending.  States that are 
eligible to participate in TANF receive an annual “block 
grant” from HHS, and thus, unlike the AFDC program, 
TANF imposes a cap on the total federal funds each 
participating state is entitled to receive annually. 
 PRWORA § 116(b)(3) establishes guidelines for the 
close-out of state AFDC programs during the transition to 
TANF.  In relevant part, it provides: 
Claims made with respect to State expenditures 
under a State plan approved under part A of title 
IV of the Social Security Act (as in effect on 
September 30, 1995) with respect to assistance 
or services provided on or before September 30, 
1995, shall be treated as claims with respect to 
expenditures during fiscal year 1995 for 
purposes of reimbursement even if payment was 
made by a State on or after October 1, 1995.  
Each State shall complete the filing of all claims 
under the State plan (as so in effect) within 2 
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years after the date of the enactment of this Act.  
The head of each Federal department shall— 
(A) use the single audit procedure to review and 
resolve any claims in connection with the close 
out of programs under such State plans. 
PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 116(b)(3), 110 Stat. 2105 
(1996). 
 The “single audit procedure” to which reference is 
made in § 116(b)(3) is established by the Single Audit Act of 
1984 (“SAA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7507.  Under the SAA, 
“[e]ach non-Federal entity” that expends at least $300,000 of 
Federal awards in a fiscal year “shall have either a single 
audit or a program-specific audit made for such fiscal year in 
accordance with the requirements of this chapter.”  31 U.S.C. 
§ 7502(a)(1)(A). 
 The Administration for Children and Families 
(“ACF”), the division of HHS responsible for administering 
the former AFDC and current TANF programs, interpreted § 
116 in a series of program instructions (“PI”s) that clarified 
ACF policy for the recovery of AFDC overpayments and 
provided the states with directions for closing out their AFDC 
accounts in accordance with § 116.  On March 9, 1999, ACF 
issued PI 99-2, which required states to remit to HHS the 
federal share of recovered overpayments made to recipients 
on or before September 30, 1996, but permitted states to 
retain the full amount of recovered overpayments of AFDC or 
TANF funds paid to recipients after October 1, 1996, with the 
recovered overpayments to be applied towards TANF 
program costs.  PI 99-2 also provided that states must submit 
the federal share of overpayments to the ACF in quarterly 
checks.  On May 1, 2000, ACF issued PI 99-2 (Revised), 
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which permitted states to retain the full amount of recovered 
overpayments but stated that “the amounts recovered must be 
credited against the current grant in the fiscal year in which 
the overpayment was recovered.”  (A. 122-23.) 
 On September 1, 2000, ACF issued PI 2000-2, which 
rescinded PI 99-2 and PI 99-2 (Revised) and replaced them 
with a new overpayment recovery policy.  PI 2000-2 
reiterated the continuing requirement to remit the federal 
share of recovered AFDC overpayments.  PI 2000-2 required 
the states to remit the federal share of pre-October 1, 1996 
overpayments to ACF by check, and provided the states with 
instructions for making these repayments going forward.  It 
also provided that it was only “effective for recoveries made 
after 9/30/96,” and that “[r]ecoveries made prior to the date of 
this transmittal [i.e., September 1, 2000] will be evaluated on 
reasonable interpretation of statutory requirements or any 
previous guidance provided by ACF.”  (A. 125.) 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
 In August 2007, the HHS Office of Inspector General 
(“OIG”) conducted a nationwide audit to determine whether 
states were complying with the requirements to reimburse the 
federal share of recovered AFDC overpayments made before 
October 1, 1996.  According to the OIG report, of the 43 
states reviewed, 24 states had complied with the federal 
requirements and reimbursed ACF for overpayment 
recoveries from July 2002 through June 2006, while 19 states 
and the District of Columbia continued to collect 
overpayments, but did not reimburse ACF $28.7 million for 
the federal share of recoveries.  The OIG report 
recommended that ACF collect the federal share of the 
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overpayments from the states that had not complied with the 
reimbursement requirements. 
 The OIG audit found that the Pennsylvania DPW, the 
state agency responsible for administering the former AFDC 
and current TANF programs, had recovered $10,598,095 in 
AFDC overpayments from October 1, 1996 through June 30, 
2006, but had not reimbursed ACF for the federal share of 
$5,609,572.  Pursuant to this audit, on June 26, 2008, the OIG 
sent a letter to DPW requesting remittance of the federal 
share of $5,609,572 by check made payable to HHS within 30 
days. 
 DPW appealed this reimbursement request, or 
“disallowance,” to the HHS Departmental Appeals Board 
(“DAB” or “Board”).  DPW did not contest the OIG audit 
findings with respect to either the amount of AFDC 
overpayments recovered or the calculation of the federal 
share.  Rather, it challenged HHS’ authority to conduct the 
audit.  It argued that PRWORA § 116(b) designates the SAA 
as providing the exclusive audit procedure for the close-out of 
the AFDC program, and thus precludes HHS from requiring 
reimbursement based on the results of its own audit.  DPW 
submitted declarations stating that its federal programs, 
including TANF, had been subject to SAA audits since 1996, 
and that none of the audits had taken any “exception . . . or 
finding . . . relative to DPW’s retention of overpayment 
recoveries from the [AFDC] program.”  (A. 161.)  DPW 
argued that HHS was bound by the results of these audits. 
 DPW also argued that it was entitled to retain the 
recovered overpayments under HHS policies.  It contended 
that PI 2000-2 permitted it to retain the overpayments 
collected before September 1, 2000, because “it was not 
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unreasonable for the State to interpret” PRWORA as allowing 
it to do so.  (A. 69.)  It also claimed that it was entitled to 
retain the overpayments collected after September 1, 2000, 
because even if its retention of overpayments violated ACF 
policy in the various PIs, § 116 prohibited ACF from issuing 
such guidance documents to the states.  DPW also advanced a 
separate argument that the DAB could not give stare decisis 
effect to its prior decisions addressing AFDC overpayments 
in the TANF period because the agency had not properly 
indexed those decisions in accordance with the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) requirements that agencies 
maintain published indices of their final decisions.  5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(2). 
 In a decision issued on April 16, 2009, the DAB 
rejected each DPW argument and upheld the HHS 
determination requiring DPW to remit the federal share of 
$5,609,572 to HHS.  The DAB held that the reference to the 
SAA in § 116(b) does not preclude HHS from relying on the 
accurate results of its own audit of the states’ accounting of 
federal grants.  It also held that DPW is not entitled to retain 
the funds under either federal appropriations law or the 
statutory limits on TANF grants.  The DAB also rejected the 
DPW challenge to its precedent, holding that the website 
indexing its decisions satisfies FOIA requirements. 
 In June 2009, DPW sought judicial review of the DAB 
decision in the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  Count One of its Complaint challenged the 
agency’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), on two grounds.  First, it argued 
that the DAB decision upholding the reimbursement directive 
“was not in accordance with law,” reasserting its argument 
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that PRWORA designates the SAA procedure as the 
exclusive audit procedure.  Second, it claimed that the 
conclusion that DPW was not entitled to retain the federal 
share of the AFDC overpayment recoveries under substantive 
law was “arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law.”  (A. 20.)  
Count two raised a FOIA claim based on HHS’ alleged 
failure to maintain an adequate published index of its prior 
decisions. While DPW conceded that it was not prejudiced by 
this alleged failure in the instant dispute, it sought ongoing 
injunctive relief to compel HHS to comply with FOIA 
requirements. 
 In an order entered on October 14, 2010, the District 
Court granted summary judgment for HHS on both counts.  
On Count One, the Court first held that the DAB reasonably 
rejected DPW’s “procedural” argument, concluding that there 
was no support for the assertion that PRWORA prohibits 
HHS from conducting its own audit.  The District Court next 
held that the conclusion that DPW was not substantively 
entitled to retain the federal share of the recovered 
overpayments was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to 
law.  On Count Two, the District Court held that DPW lacked 
standing to raise the FOIA claim because it had alleged no 
injury from the allegedly inadequate indices.  DPW now 
appeals the District Court’s decision. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We apply de novo review to a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in a case brought under the APA, 
“and in turn apply the applicable standard of review to the 
underlying agency decision.”  Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. 
v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
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underlying agency decision is reviewed under the APA, 
which requires courts to set aside an agency decision that is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law,” or that was conducted “without 
observance of procedure required by law.”1
III. 
  5 U.S.C. §§ 
706(2)(A) & (D); Chao v. Roy’s Const., Inc., 517 F.3d 180, 
186 (3d Cir. 2008).  With respect to the grant of summary 
judgment on the FOIA claim, we review dismissals for lack 
of standing under a de novo standard.  Common Cause of Pa. 
v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Section 603(b)(2) of Title 42 describes the methods for 
computing federal payments to the states and provides that 
the amount shall be: 
                                              
1 DPW's challenge to the DAB's interpretation of 
PRWORA's transition provision raises the question whether 
deference is appropriate under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  The 
District Court concluded that Chevron deference is 
inapplicable (see A. 45-53), and although HHS does not raise 
this issue, DPW contends that the DAB decision is not 
entitled to deference.  (DPW Reply at 1-2).  Recently, we 
held that the DAB's interpretation of statutory provisions that 
are part of the Medicaid program is entitled to Chevron 
deference.  See Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services, 647 F.3d 506, 510-11 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We find it unnecessary to decide whether our recent 
decision is applicable in the context presented here, as we 
find that the DAB decision withstands plenary review. 
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[R]educed by a sum equivalent to the pro 
rata share to which the United States is 
equitably entitled, as determined by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, of 
the net amount recovered during any prior 
quarter by the State or any political 
subdivision thereof with respect to aid to 
families with dependent children furnished 
under the State plan. 
42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(2)(B) (repealed).  Although PRWORA 
repealed most of the AFDC, § 116(b)(2) preserves certain 
powers and responsibilities under the AFDC, including: 
[A]dministrative actions and proceedings 
commenced before such date [of the AFDC’s 
repeal], or authorized before such date to be 
commenced, under such provisions. 
42 U.S.C. § 116(b)(2)(B).  The HHS letter requesting 
remittance of the federal share of AFDC overpayments made 
through September 30, 1996, is a collection proceeding that 
was “authorized . . . to be commenced” before the AFDC was 
repealed.  Specifically, 45 C.F.R. § 74.72(a) provides: 
(a) The closeout of an award does not affect 
any of the following: (1) the right of the 
HHS awarding agency to disallow costs and 
recover funds on the basis of a later audit or 
other review. (2) The obligation of the 
recipient to return any funds due as a result 
of later refunds, corrections, or other 
transactions. 
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(Emphasis added).  Thus, even after “[t]he closeout of an 
award,” this regulation preserves both HHS’ authority “to 
disallow costs and recover funds on the basis of a later 
audit,” and DPW’s obligation, as a recipient of funds, “to 
return any funds due as a result of later refunds.”  Id. 
 The statutory scheme therefore authorizes HHS’ 
disallowance letter and establishes at the very least its 
presumptive entitlement to the requested funds.  DPW 
challenges this conclusion by advancing various legal 
theories why the reimbursement directive was unauthorized, 
and why, in any event, DPW is entitled to retain the funds.  
For the reasons set forth herein, we reject each of these 
arguments. 
DPW challenges HHS’ authority to require the 
disallowance by claiming that PRWORA’s transition 
provision, § 116(b)(3)(A), prohibits it.  Section 116(b)(3)(A) 
provides: 
The head of each Federal department shall—(A) 
use the single audit procedure to review and 
resolve any claims in connection with the close 
out of programs under such State plans. 
(Emphasis added).  Emphasizing the seemingly mandatory 
“shall use” and broad “any claims” language, DPW interprets 
this provision to mean that HHS must rely on the results of 
audits conducted pursuant to the SAA procedure in resolving 
all claims relating to the close-out of the AFDC program—
including federal claims for the federal share of recovered 
AFDC overpayments.  Accordingly, DPW reasons that this 
provision prohibits the HHS reimbursement demand, which 
relied on the result of the OIG audit.  Moreover, DPW argues 
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that since HHS is bound by the results of the SAA audits, 
which took no exception to DPW’s failure to remit the federal 
share of its AFDC overpayments between October 1996 and 
June 2006, HHS has no authority for its demand. 
DPW argues that this interpretation is consistent with 
PRWORA’s overall statutory scheme and purpose.  As 
evidence of this purpose, DPW cites 42 U.S.C. § 617, which 
provides: 
No officer or employee of the Federal 
Government may regulate the conduct of States 
under this part or enforce any provision of this 
part, except to the extent expressly provided in 
this part. 
This section narrowly circumscribes the scope of HHS 
authority with regard to TANF, and the legislative history of 
this provision evinces Congress’ intent in this regard: 
Many States are highly critical of the current 
welfare system’s lack of flexibility and high 
degree of Federal regulation.  This provision is 
designed to explicitly restrict the ability of 
Federal officials to regulate State block grant 
programs, except as specifically provided under 
the committee proposal. 
House Report 104-651, at 1371 (emphasis added).  However, 
the language of § 617 and the legislative history indicate that 
this provision limits HHS authority only with respect to 
TANF, and not with respect to the AFDC program.  
Accordingly, this provision does not affect our interpretation 
of HHS authority to disallow AFDC overpayments. 
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 DPW also asserts that § 116(b)(2)(B), discussed supra, 
“prohibit[s] HHS from issuing any new policies relative to the 
AFDC program that would bind the single auditors.”  (DPW 
Br. at 16.)  DPW reasons that these provisions and the 
legislative history reflect Congress’ intent to create a “‘hands 
off’ approach to Federal interference” with TANF.  (Id.)  It 
argues that § 116(b)(3)(A) should be construed, consistent 
with the overall statutory purpose, as prohibiting HHS from 
relying on its own audit procedures in resolving AFDC-
related claims. 
DPW’s interpretation of the pertinent statutory 
provisions is only plausible when the language of § 
116(b)(3)(A)—particularly the “shall use” and “any claims” 
terms—is read in isolation from the relevant statutory context 
and definitions.  We, however, agree with the DAB and 
District Court that the meaning of the provision must be 
determined in light of the relevant statutory context.  
Following this approach, we concur with their interpretation 
of § 116(b)(3)(A) as permitting HHS to conduct its own 
audits in addition to the single audit procedure employed by 
DPW.  We reach this interpretation after identifying two 
flaws in DPW’s interpretation of the provision. 
A. “Any Claims” 
First, we conclude that § 116(b)(3)(A)’s directive—to 
use the SAA procedure to resolve “any claims” connected 
with the close-out of AFDC programs—does not apply to 
federal claims for the federal share of recovered AFDC 
overpayments.  DPW’s contrary interpretation depends on 
reading the words “any claims” in isolation from the relevant 
context.  As the District Court observed, the phrase “any 
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claims” must be considered in the context of the entirety of § 
116(b)(3), which provides: 
CLOSING OUT ACCOUNT FOR THOSE 
PROGRAMS TERMINATED OR 
SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED BY THIS 
TITLE. — In closing out accounts, Federal and 
State officials may use scientifically acceptable 
statistical sampling techniques.  Claims made 
with respect to State expenditures under a State 
plan approved under part A of title IV of the 
Social Security Act (as in effect on September 
30, 1995) with respect to assistance or services 
provided on or before September 30, 1995, shall 
be treated as claims with respect to expenditures 
during fiscal year 1995 for purposes of 
reimbursement even if payment was made by a 
State on or after October 1, 1995.  Each State 
shall complete the filing of all claims under the 
State plan (as so in effect) within 2 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(Emphasis added).  The following subpart, § 116(b)(3)(A), 
then provides that “[t]he head of each Federal department 
shall—(A) use the single audit procedure to review and 
resolve any claims in connection with the close out of 
programs under such State plans.”  Thus, the words “any 
claims in connection with the close out of programs” appear 
in the context of a provision that discusses “claims” 
exclusively in terms of state claims: claims that states must 
file for state expenditures made under state plans.  Moreover, 
the subsequent subpart of § 116(b)(3) reinforces the exclusive 
focus of this provision on “state” claims: 
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The head of each Federal department shall— . . 
. (B) reimburse States for any payments made 
for assistance or services provided during a 
prior fiscal year from funds for fiscal year 1995, 
rather than from funds authorized by this title. 
§ 116(b)(3)(B).  Thus, the surrounding statutory text indicates 
that this provision is concerned with claims that the states 
make for reimbursement from the federal government for 
their expenditures under the AFDC program. 
 That the phrase “any claims” in § 116(b)(3)(A) refers 
to claims asserted by a state is made especially clear in the 
sentence immediately preceding § 116(b)(3)(A).  This 
sentence establishes the filing deadline for state claims, i.e., 
two years after the enactment of the legislation.  ACF 
explained this requirement in PI 97-4, which “provide[d] 
guidance to States for the closeout of the AFDC” and detailed 
some of the procedures for transitioning to TANF in 
accordance with § 116.  (A. 211.)  Explaining the meaning of 
this sentence, PI 97-4 noted: “all expenditures that a State 
claims pursuant to these instructions” must, among other 
requirements, “meet the two year limit for filing claims for 
expenditures, in accordance with Section 1132 of the Social 
Security Act and 45 CFR Part 95, Subpart A.”  (A. 211 
(emphasis added).) 
 Section 1132 of the Social Security Act provides for a 
two-year period for filing “any claim by a State for payment 
with respect to an expenditure made during any calendar 
quarter by the State—(1) in carrying out a State plan . . . .”  42 
U.S.C. § 1320b-2(a) (emphasis added).  Additionally, 45 
C.F.R. § 95.4 defines “claim” as follows: “In this subpart— . . 
. Claim means a request for Federal financial participation in 
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the manner and format required by our program regulations, 
and instructions and directives issued thereunder.”  45 C.F.R. 
§ 95.4 (emphasis added). 
 Section 116(b)(3) is focused exclusively on state 
claims for federal reimbursement.  None of the surrounding 
statutory language contemplates federal claims for states to 
repay the federal share of recovered AFDC overpayments.  
Furthermore, the two-year filing period plainly could not 
contemplate HHS claims for state-recovered AFDC 
overpayments given the fact that recoupment of 
overpayments from welfare beneficiaries occurs over a course 
of many years. 
 DPW contends that “[w]hen Congress wants to refer to 
State claims, it customarily uses the modifier ‘state’ in close 
conjunction with the word ‘claim,’” and points out that this 
modifier “state” “appears throughout § 116(b)(3), except in 
the clause at § 116(b)(3)(A).”  (DPW Br. at 17.)  It concludes: 
“Had Congress wanted to tie back the words ‘any claims’ to 
the earlier references to state claims, it would have said ‘HHS 
shall use the single audit procedure to review and solve such 
claims.’”  (Id.)  This argument invokes an expressio unius 
type of logic: that the inclusion of “state” in the preceding 
discussion of claims is purposeful, and therefore, so too is the 
omission of this qualifier in the ensuing subpart. 
 Even assuming arguendo that Congress “customarily” 
refers to state claims by including “state” in close conjunction 
with “claim”—a sweeping hypothesis about statutory writing 
for which DPW offers no evidence—it does not follow that 
Congress would include that modifier where it is evident from 
the context that it refers to state claims.  In any event, we do 
not agree that “any claims” is unconnected to the word “state” 
18 
 
in § 116(b)(3)(A).  In fact, this provision makes such a link, 
as it says: “any claims in connection with the close out of 
programs under such State plans.”  § 116(b)(3)(A).  This 
language tracks the preceding sentence, which makes clear 
the type of claims that are “in connection with the close out”: 
“all claims under the State plan” that states must file within a 
two-year deadline.  § 116(b)(3).  Indeed, the reference to 
“such State plans” indicates that § 116(b)(3)(A) clearly refers 
back to this preceding sentence, which was concerned only 
with “state” claims. 
DPW also challenges this interpretation by invoking 
the Supreme Court’s statement that “the words ‘any claim’ 
are sweeping words in common usage.”  (DPW Br. at 17, 
quoting United States v. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543 (1951).)  
DPW’s argument, however, is untethered from the context of 
the Yellow Cab Court’s statement.  In Yellow Cab, the Court 
was considering whether the United States could be sued for 
contribution by a joint tortfeasor under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act when it remarked: “The words ‘any claim against 
the United States . . . on account of personal injury’ are broad 
words in common usage. They are not words of art.”  340 
U.S. at 548.  Thus, the Court was considering the meaning of 
the words “any claim” in a statute concerning tort claims 
against the United States.  By contrast, in the current case we 
consider the meaning “any claims” in the context of a 
provision that has narrowed the discussion to a particular 
category of state claims.  The statement in Yellow Cab does 
not require us to disregard this context and interpret it as 
referring to the broad category of “any” claim that could be 
brought “in connection with the close out of” AFDC 
programs. 
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 When viewed in their fixed position within the 
relevant context, we think the words “any claims” are 
reasonably read as referring to the narrower category of state 
claims for federal reimbursement of state expenditures, 
submitted within the two-year filing period.  We therefore 
conclude that the single audit directive in § 116(b)(3)(A) does 
not apply to federal claims for state reimbursement of the 
federal share of recovered AFDC overpayments. 
B. “Shall Use” 
Second, even if “any claims” does include federal 
claims for state reimbursement of the federal share of 
recovered AFDC overpayments, we nevertheless find that § 
116(b)(3)(A) did not require ACF to rely on the results of 
SAA audits in order to require reimbursement.  DPW’s 
argument that the provision prohibits ACF from conducting 
its own audit is predicated on its interpretation of the “shall . . 
. use the single audit procedure” language as imposing a 
mandatory requirement on ACF to rely on the results of the 
single audit procedure.  However, a close examination of the 
statutory context, including the SAA, supports the conclusion 
that “using” its procedure does not require exclusive reliance 
on it. 
“[T]he single audit procedure” refers to the method for 
conducting audits under the SAA, which provides that 
method as part of a scheme for reducing the burden on federal 
funding recipients of complying with various audit 
requirements.  As the SAA states: “An audit conducted in 
accordance with this chapter shall be in lieu of any financial 
audit of Federal awards which a non-Federal entity is required 
to undergo under any other Federal law or regulation.”  31 
U.S.C. § 7503(a).  However, the SAA also expressly 
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preserves the authority of federal agencies to conduct their 
own audits: 
Notwithstanding subsection (a), a Federal 
agency may conduct or arrange for additional 
audits which are necessary to carry out its 
responsibilities under Federal law or regulation.  
The provisions of this chapter do not authorize 
any non-Federal entity (or subrecipient thereof) 
to constrain, in any manner, such agency from 
carrying out or arranging for such additional 
audits, except that the Federal agency shall plan 
such audits to not be duplicative of other audits 
of Federal awards. 
31 U.S.C. § 7503(b).  Therefore, while the SAA prohibits 
ACF from requiring DPW to conduct more than one audit of 
its Title IV-A program in any fiscal year, it does not restrict 
ACF from conducting its own audit when “necessary to carry 
out its responsibilities under Federal law or regulation.”  Id.  
Because the HHS audit was necessary to enable HHS to 
complete its responsibility to monitor state expenditures 
under the AFDC program, the HHS audit was not precluded 
by the SSA. 
 DPW resists this interpretation, reasoning that the 
requirement to use the SAA procedure implicitly precludes 
HHS from using an “exception to that procedure.”  (DPW Br. 
at 18.)  We disagree.  The SAA preserves a federal agency’s 
authority to carry out additional audits as necessary, and there 
is no indication in § 116(b)(3)(A) that Congress intended to 
depart from this feature of the SAA.  We do not believe that 
Congress would attempt to convey this purpose by referring 
to the SAA, which expressly preserves agency authority to 
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conduct audits.  Rather, if Congress intended to designate 
only one part of the SAA and exclude application of the rest 
of the Act, we believe it would have manifested this intent 
more clearly.  When considered in light of the SAA, the most 
reasonable interpretation of § 116(b)(3) is that it restricts 
HHS from imposing additional audit requirements on states in 
the process of closing out their AFDC programs, but does not 
preclude HHS from conducting its own audits.  We therefore 
conclude that § 116(b)(3)(A) does not prohibit HHS from 
relying on the results of its own audit in order to require DPW 
to remit the federal share of recovered AFDC overpayments. 
C. DPW’s Remaining Arguments 
DPW next argues that even if HHS is not bound by the 
results of the single audit, Pennsylvania is nonetheless 
entitled to retain the federal share of recovered AFDC 
overpayments under substantive law.  DPW advances several 
disjointed arguments to defend its entitlement to the funds.  
For the sake of clarity, we will address each of the arguments 
according to the asserted legal basis of the claim. 
1. “Equitable Entitlement” under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 603(b) and PRWORA § 116(b)(2)(B) 
 DPW argues that “whether or not HHS is entitled” to 
recover the federal share of Pennsylvania’s recovered AFDC 
overpayments “depends upon whether [HHS] is ‘equitably 
entitled’” to the funds under § 603(b) of the old AFDC 
statute.  (DPW Br. at 20-21.)  This provision stated, in 
relevant part, that the HHS Secretary shall compute the 
amount to be paid to each state, which amount shall be: 
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[R]educed by a sum equivalent to the pro rata 
share to which the United States is equitably 
entitled, as determined by the Secretary of 
[HHS], of the net amount recovered during any 
prior quarter by the State or any political 
subdivision thereof with respect to aid to 
families with dependent children furnished 
under the State plan. 
42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(2)(B) (repealed) (emphasis added).  DPW 
argues that PRWORA § 116(b)(2)(B) stripped the HHS 
Secretary of the authority to make this determination under 
the repealed AFDC, because this administrative action was 
not “commenced . . . or authorized . . . to be commenced” 
prior to the effective date of PRWORA on July 1, 1997.  
(DPW Br. at 20, quoting PRWORA § 116(b)(2)(B).)  In this 
ostensible vacuum of authority, argues DPW, “it was up to 
the State (or the single auditors . . .) to decide whether HHS 
was equitably entitled to a refund.”  (Id. at 21.)  Since 
“[n]either of these parties made such a determination,” DPW 
neatly concludes that it is entitled to retain the funds.  (Id.) 
 First, we agree with the view taken by the District 
Court, which rejected DPW’s contention that § 603(b) 
required the HHS Secretary to make an “explicit finding of 
equitable entitlement.”  (A. 31.)  Second, we reject DPW’s 
claim that § 116(b)(2) stripped HHS of its authority to seek 
reimbursement.  To the contrary, as discussed supra, § 
116(b)(2)(B) preserves HHS’ authority to disallow the federal 
share of recovered AFDC overpayments because it was a 
collection proceeding that was authorized under 45 C.F.R. § 
74.72(a) to be commenced prior to PRWORA’s effective 
date.  Even if it were not the case that PRWORA preserves 
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HHS’ authority in this regard, we are not persuaded by 
DPW’s claim that the equitable entitlement determination 
would fall by default to DPW or the single auditors.  DPW 
offers no explanation for this conclusion, and we discern no 
plausible basis for it. 
2. Unambiguous Statutory Repayment 
Conditions 
 DPW next argues that it is not required to reimburse 
HHS because the repayment obligation was not stated 
unambiguously in the AFDC, and is therefore invalid.2
                                              
2 While DPW acknowledges that it “did not argue for 
the grant-law standard for review below,” it insists that “a 
party cannot waive the proper standard for review in the 
Court of Appeals” and accordingly this Court “has an 
obligation to apply the correct legal standard.”  (DPW Reply 
at 3, n. 2, citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 
290 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hether an incorrect legal standard 
has been used . . . is an issue of law to be reviewed de 
novo.”)).  DPW’s argument appears to be substantive, rather 
than a standard for review of a claim.  We need not resolve 
that issue, however, because DPW’s argument lacks merit. 
  For 
this proposition it cites Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), and its progeny, which upheld 
Congress’ power to attach conditions to federal grants to 
states so long as the conditions are stated unambiguously.  
451 U.S. at 17.  To determine whether a statute satisfies this 
clarity requirement, courts “ask whether . . . a state official 
would clearly understand . . . the obligations” of the law, and 
“whether the [statute] furnishes clear notice regarding the 
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liability at issue in [the] case.”  Arlington Cent. School Dist. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006). 
 DPW asserts that “the question before the Court thus 
reduces to whether the old AFDC statute, as modified by the 
transition provision of PRWORA, unambiguously requires 
Pennsylvania to make repayment of the Federal portion of the 
AFDC overpayment collections.”  (DPW Reply at 2-3.)  
DPW contends that “[t]here is no unambiguous repayment 
condition in the statute,” and effectively reasserts its 
arguments about 42 U.S.C § 603(b) and PRWORA § 
116(b)(2).  (Id. at 3.)  It claims that 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(2), 
which required the states’ funds to be reduced by the “pro rata 
share to which the United States is equitably entitled, as 
determined by the [HHS] Secretary,” does not impose a 
mandatory repayment obligation, but rather calls for a 
“discretionary determination.”  (Id.)  DPW then argues that § 
116(b)(2) revoked the Secretary’s authority to determine 
whether HHS was “equitably entitled” to repayment, and that 
the authority to make this decision was transferred to the 
single auditors, who “made no such determination here.”  
(Id.) 
 DPW’s argument relies on misunderstandings of both 
the Pennhurst clear notice requirement and § 603(b)(2).  The 
rationale underlying the Pennhurst requirement is that, 
because a conditional grant is akin to a contract, recipients of 
federal funds should accept the attached conditions 
“voluntarily and knowingly.”  451 U.S. at 17.  “States cannot 
knowingly accept conditions of which they are ‘unaware’ or 
which they are ‘unable to ascertain.’”  Arlington, 548 U.S. at 
296 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).  Yet, DPW does not 
demonstrate that it was unaware or unable to ascertain that § 
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603(b)(2) created a repayment obligation.  DPW’s only 
argument in this regard—that the repayment obligation 
depended on the Secretary’s “discretionary determination that 
HHS was ‘equitably entitled’ to return of the money”—is 
unavailing.  (DPW Reply at 3.)  Section 603(b)(2)(B) 
provides clear notice to states that the federal payments they 
receive will be “reduced by a sum,” i.e., the share to which 
the federal government is “equitably entitled.”  The fact that 
the Secretary is responsible for determining the amount of 
this federal share in no way renders the condition ambiguous.  
Even assuming that this determination is “discretionary,” this 
does not run afoul of Pennhurst, which merely requires that 
states have clear notice of conditions on accepting federal 
funds, and imposes no requirement that such conditions be 
unconditional. 
3. HHS Program Instructions  
 DPW also argues that the program instructions HHS 
issued during the TANF period authorized DPW to retain the 
disallowed funds.  DPW cites PI 2006-03, which ACF issued 
on June 20, 2006, and which stated that a state’s retention of 
recoveries made prior to the date of that transmittal would be 
evaluated “on reasonable interpretation of statutory 
requirements.”  (A. 133.)  DPW argues that because its 
interpretation of the statute “is reasonable, so it is entitle [sic] 
to retain the AFDC overpayment collections.”  (DPW Br. at 
23.)  In this regard it asserts, without citation to any authority, 
that “[t]o demonstrate reasonableness the Court need only ask 
itself if the arguments for state retention of the money would 
be sustained if HHS advanced them,” and unsurprisingly 
concludes that in its case, “[i]t should be clear that they 
would.”  (Id.)  DPW then reasons that “[s]ince HHS is bound 
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by its own guidance saying that it would accept any 
reasonable interpretation of PWORA . . . Pennsylvania is 
entitled to retain the funds.”  (Id., citation omitted.) 
 The District Court rejected DPW’s argument that it 
“reasonably interpreted PI 99-2 (Revised) to permit retention 
of the AFDC overpayments” recovered before September 1, 
2000.  (A. 23.)  The District Court correctly held that PI 99-2 
(Revised) required states to credit the federal share of 
recovered AFDC overpayments “against the TANF grant in 
the fiscal year in which the overpayments were recovered.”  
Because DPW “supplemented its TANF grants” with the 
funds, rather than crediting them, it did not reasonably rely on 
that program instruction.  (A. 24.) 
4. Federal Appropriations Law under 31 
U.S.C. § 1301(a) 
 DPW also argues that the District Court erred in 
upholding the DAB’s decision that the State had no right to 
retain the federal share of the AFDC overpayment recoveries 
under Federal appropriations law.  Section 1301(a) provides 
that Federal “[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the 
objects for which the appropriations were made except as 
otherwise provided by law.”  31 U.S.C. § 1301(a).  Before the 
DAB and District Court, DPW acknowledged that its use of 
the recovered AFDC overpayments made before September 
30, 1996 to supplement its TANF grant was a violation of 
general appropriation law, but argued that an exception to this 
general law applied.  The DAB and District Court both 
rejected this argument because the exception was 
inapplicable, and DPW failed to identify any other statutory 
provision which supersedes §1301(a) to permit its use of 
AFDC funds for the TANF program. 
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 In defense of its retention of AFDC funds for its 
TANF program, DPW first contends that § 1301(a) “governs 
how Federal agencies spend money, not what recipients of 
Federal funds do with money after it is paid.”  (DPW Br. at 
21.)  In support of this claim, DPW offers only “the fact that 
[sic] title of the United States Code subchapter in which this 
provision is located is entitled ‘The Budget Process,’” and 
reasons that a contrary conclusion would “make an 
appropriations act violation out of every use of Federal funds 
by an ultimate recipient contrary to the intended purpose.”  
(Id.) 
 DPW’s interpretation of federal appropriations law—
in support of which it cites no substantive authority—is 
contrary to the commonly understood principle that public 
funds “may be used only for the purpose for which they were 
appropriated.”  (HHS Br. at 16, citing Principles of Federal 
Appropriations Law, 2d ed., U.S. General Accounting Office, 
July 1991, OGC-91-5, at 4-2.)  Moreover, as HHS observes, 
because DPW “‘d[id] not dispute [in District Court] that its 
use of the’” AFDC funds for TANF program costs “‘violated 
general Federal appropriations law,’” it has waived its 
opportunity to raise a contrary argument now.  (Id. at 17, 
quoting A. 21.) 
 DPW next contends that if federal appropriations law 
applies, it complied with it by applying AFDC funds to the 
TANF program, which benefited the same “objects” of the 
AFDC appropriation: “needy families with children.”  (DPW 
Br. at 22.)  However, as we just explained, DPW waived this 
argument when it failed to dispute that its use of AFDC funds 
for the TANF program violated federal appropriations law.  
In any event, the merits of this argument are unavailing, 
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because despite sharing similar purposes, AFDC and TANF 
are distinct statutes with separate appropriations, and DPW 
cites no statutory provision which purports to authorize the 
use of AFDC funds to supplement the TANF program. 
 Finally, DPW argues that § 1301 “does not apply 
where ‘otherwise provided by law,’” and maintains that the 
repealed AFDC statute “allows States to retain the 
overpayment collections unless there is a determination that 
HHS is ‘equitably entitled’ to a refund.”  (DPW Br. at 22.)  
We conclude that DPW has also waived this argument, which 
it did not raise before the agency.  See United States v. L.A. 
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1952); Dir., Office 
of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. N. Am. Coal Corp., 626 F.2d 
1137, 1143-44 (3d Cir 1980). 
5. TANF Spending Cap under 42 U.S.C. § 
603(a)(1) 
 As part of the tradeoff of state flexibility for reduced 
federal welfare spending, 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1) provides for a 
dollar limit, or “cap,” on the federal TANF funds that a state 
can receive in a fiscal year.  Before the DAB and District 
Court, DPW argued that it was entitled to retain the AFDC 
funds recovered before September 1, 2000 because DPW’s 
retention of the federal share of recovered AFDC 
overpayments did not exceed the TANF cap on federal funds.  
In this regard, DPW claimed that the annual State Family 
Assistance Grant (“SFAG”) does not set the cap on funds a 
state may receive under TANF, because states may be eligible 
for a bonus, supplemental grant, or contingency funds.  The 
District Court and DAB properly rejected “this possibility 
[as] meaningless,” reasoning that, while a state’s annual 
TANF funds may be increased beyond the SFAG by a bonus, 
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supplemental grant, or contingency funds, these amounts are 
determined by “a statutory formula under Title IV,” and thus 
the statute still imposes a dollar cap on a state’s annual 
federal TANF grant.  (A. 25.)  They concluded that DPW 
“may not . . . exceed[] [this cap] by using AFDC 
overpayment recoveries to supplement those funds.”  (A. 25.)  
We agree with this interpretation of the TANF dollar cap, and 
since DPW offers no persuasive argument to defeat this 
interpretation, we conclude that the District Court did not err. 
IV. 
A. Lack of Standing to Pursue a FOIA Claim 
 Turning to its FOIA claim, DPW argues that the 
District Court erred in granting summary judgment against it 
on the grounds that it lacked standing.  The gist of DPW’s 
claim is that FOIA requires agencies to publish “current 
indexes providing identifying information for the public as to 
any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, 
and required by this paragraph to be made available or 
published.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).  DPW asserts that the DAB 
fails to satisfy its duties under this requirement because it 
provides only a listing of decisions and a key word search 
engine on the agency’s website. 
 HHS challenged DPW’s standing to raise this issue 
before the District Court, and DPW responded with a Rule 
56(f) motion and declaration.  The declaration asserted that 
the lack of an index prevented it from effectively representing 
itself before the DAB, because its counsel could not 
conclusively determine whether it had found all relevant 
precedent on the search engine.  The declaration also claimed 
that the search engine’s key-word search function was 
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inadequate because the DAB decisions do not use uniform 
wording.  DPW offered an example of a principle that could 
not be searched by word, but could be categorized by topic. 
 The District Court did not consider the merits of this 
claim, and instead dismissed it for lack of standing due to its 
failure to allege an adequate injury, explaining: 
PA DPW has failed to cite a single instance in 
which the alleged inadequacy of the DAB’s 
“index” of its final decision under FOIA has 
resulted in its failure to find a prior DAB 
decision which would have been advantageous 
to PA DPW in an appeal before the DAB.  As a 
result, this case is simply not the proper case to 
challenge generally the sufficiency of the 
DAB’s “index” of its final decisions. 
(A. 35-36.) 
 To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff has the burden 
of establishing an “injury in fact”: a harm that is both 
concrete and particularized, either actual or imminent, and not 
conjectural or hypothetical.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  In Cervase v. Office of the Fed. 
Register, 580 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1978), a lawyer sought to 
compel the Office of the Federal Register to compile an index 
of the Code of Federal Regulations.  He argued that the Table 
of Contents to the Code made it “almost impossible for [him] 
to know which federal regulations appl[ied] to [him.]”  Id. at 
1167.  We held that the lawyer had standing under FOIA 
because “[t]he Federal Register Act was intended to confer 
upon the general public rights of access to agency rulings,” 
and this was clearly intended to benefit a “practicing attorney, 
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who by virtue of his profession must advise others about their 
legal rights.”  Id. at 1172. Therefore, we found that the 
lawyer’s “inability to retrieve information from the Federal 
Register” was an injury-in-fact.  Id. 
 In Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. United States Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services, No. 99-175, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3492 (W.D. Pa. Feb 7, 2001) (hereinafter, 
“Pennsylvania”), then-District Court Judge D. Brooks Smith 
held that DPW was injured by the DAB’s failure to index 
certain policy statements.  2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3492, at 
*63-64.  The Court observed that “[w]ithout current or 
complete indices . . . the [state] is unable to determine 
precisely what rules and regulations govern its conduct and is 
without sufficient information to structure its AFDC, EA, and 
TANF programs in the future.”  Id.  As a result, the state was 
injured because it was “deprived of information” that 
Congress intended it to have.  Id. 
 However, the harms that DPW alleges in the case at 
bar are not equivalent to the injuries-in-fact in these cases.  In 
its Rule 56(f) declaration, DPW described the various ways in 
which it was injured by the DAB’s allegedly inadequate 
index.  It explained that “the lack of an index has hampered 
[DPW counsel’s] effective representation of DPW before the 
DAB.”  (A. 237.)  It elaborated that the key word searchable 
website was inadequate, because DPW’s counsel 
[O]ften want[s] to find DAB cases setting forth 
the principle that a State’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute, regulation, or state plan is 
entitled to prevail over a Federal interpretation 
if the State has not been given notice of the 
Federal interpretation.  Those cases are difficult 
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to locate by key word because the DAB does 
not use uniform wording in discussing the issue.  
(A. 238.)  Thus, DPW generally asserts that the lack of an 
index causes it difficulty, and the specific harm it claims as a 
result is that its counsel “can never be certain that [it has] 
located all important DAB decisions on a topic because 
sometimes the topic is not susceptible to a key-word search.”  
(A. 237-38.)  DPW insists that these allegations are “more 
than an ‘unsupported assertion’ that the lack of an index 
hampered legal research.”  (DPW Reply at 7.) 
 We disagree.  There is a meaningful distinction 
between the “difficulties” that DPW identifies and the harms 
that were sufficient to qualify as injuries in Cervase and 
Pennsylvania.  Although DPW claims the lack of an index 
“hampered [DPW counsel’s] effective representation of DPW 
before the DAB,” it offers only a general description of the 
challenges of searching, explaining that some “cases are 
difficult to locate by key word,” and that it “can never be 
certain” that it has found everything.  (A. 237-38.)  Yet, such 
vague and indefinite allegations are inadequate to establish 
injury-in-fact, and DPW does not cure this deficiency by 
identifying any concrete information or cases that it was 
unable to find, or any other description of how this inability 
actually hampered its representation before the DAB. 
 While the key word search function may be 
inconvenient and create some uncertainty in the research 
process, there is no indication that DPW suffered any 
disadvantage due to the lack of an index.  In fact, DPW was 
able to locate all of the DAB precedents relevant to its 
proceeding, and although it asserts that its counsel has 
“practiced before the DAB for nearly thirty years” and 
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“handled dozens of cases in the DAB,” it does not offer a 
single example of when it was unable to locate relevant 
decisions in other cases.  Since the lack of an index has not 
made it “almost impossible” for DPW to find relevant DAB 
precedent, we conclude that the District Court did not err in 
concluding that DPW lacks standing. 
B. Rule 56(f) Decision3
 There remains one final claim that DPW asserts to 
defend its standing.  DPW argues that at the Rule 56(d) stage, 
“it was not necessary for [it] to identify a particular case 
where it was prejudiced by the lack of an index before the 
DAB.  The declaration only needed to specify what particular 
information was sought and how it would preclude summary 
judgment.”  (DPW Br. at 27.)  It argues that the District Court 
“should have allowed [it] to take depositions or other 
discovery to obtain evidence to show injury.”  (DPW Reply at 
8.)  It also asserts that Rule 56(d) “motions are usually 
 
                                              
3 DPW styled its June 16, 2010 motion to the District 
Court as a “Rule 56(f) Motion,” (A. 235-39), and the District 
Court evaluated it under the standards applied to Rule 56(f) 
motions.  (A. 43-45.)  As part of a general restyling of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in December 2007, the 
language of Rule 56(f) was amended and incorporated into 
Rule 56(d).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  These amendments 
were “intended to be stylistic only,” and Rule 56(d) “carries 
forward without substantial change the provisions of former 
subdivision (f).”  (Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(d)).  Therefore, although DPW’s briefs and much of the 
caselaw refer to the language of Rule 56(f), these changes do 
not alter our substantive legal analysis. 
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granted as a matter of course.”  (Id., citing Doe v. Abington 
Friends School, 480 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2006).) 
 When a party opposing summary judgment “believes 
that s/he needs additional time for discovery, [Rule 56(d)] 
specifies the procedure to be followed.”  Dowling v. City of 
Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 1988).  Specifically, Rule 
56(d) states: 
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or 
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
present facts essential to justify its opposition, 
the court may: —   . . . (2) allow time to obtain 
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  We have interpreted this provision to 
require “a party seeking further discovery in response to a 
summary judgment motion [to] submit an affidavit 
specifying, for example, what particular information is 
sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary 
judgment; and why it has not previously been obtained.”  
Dowling, 855 F.2d at 139-40.  DPW, however, submitted no 
such affidavit.  Thus, the District Court properly dismissed 
the FOIA claim for lack of standing. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
